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Although substantial investments and efforts have been made to combat corruption in the developing 
world, the effects of conventional anti-corruption interventions remain modest at best (Marquette and 
Pfeiffer 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi 2011). This is often reflected in the so-called implementation gap 
whereby countries continue to experience high levels of corruption despite substantial legal and 
institutional reforms that adhere to international anti-corruption best practice (ibid.). Therefore, growing 
critique has centred on the inadequacy of relying on purely legal, institutional interventions that often 
fail to take into account the nuances and peculiarities of the local operational context (Haruna 2003; 
Mette Kjaer 2004; Rugumyamheto 2004), including embedded social incentives, expectations and 
agendas vis-à-vis corruption (Baez-Camargo and Passas 2017).  
As some authors have argued, corruption may be fuelled by large-scale collective action problems 
whereby people’s decisions to engage in corrupt actions hinge upon perceptions of their close 
environment as being highly corrupt (Marquette and Pfeiffer 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi 2011; Persson, 
Rothstein, and Teorell 2013). Furthermore, corruption may not necessarily constitute a problem per se 
but can actually offer pragmatic solutions to ordinary citizens as means to ‘getting things done’ (ibid.). 
Among political and business elites, corruption may even fulfil informal governance functions critical for 
regime stability and survival (Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 2017).  
Research has only very recently begun to reveal how corrupt practices are perceived in the eyes of 
those directly engaging in them. Emerging evidence suggests that corruption is often seen as either a 
‘necessary evil’ or simply ‘the way things are done’, suggesting a high degree of social acceptability of 
corruption in local contexts where corrupt collective practices have become normalised (Koni-Hoffmann 
and Navanit-Patel 2017). In some cases, not adapting to certain normalised behaviours linked to 
corruption may bear high social costs when community expectations are not fulfilled. In other cases, 
mentally engrained collective imaginaries associated to culture or local folklore may reinforce practices 
associated with corruption. Therefore, when certain types of corrupt actions are socially embedded or 
culturally rooted, it can be said that they have become a feature during the enculturation of individuals, 
and thereby become collectively reproduced, normalised and reinforced (cf. Hoff and Stiglitz, 2015). 
The above considerations suggest that there is a crucial need to rethink the formulation of anti-
corruption approaches in order to account for locally prevailing conditions. In order to do so, there is 
increasing interest in exploring how anti-corruption practice can benefit from a better understanding of 
behavioural influences. In particular, those factors that motivate corrupt actions that do not respond to 
classic rational choice incentives - because they relate to social, cultural or other quasi-rational 
influences - and their relationship to the observed entrenched character of corrupt practices in many 
countries.  
Against this backdrop, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), through its East Africa 
Research Fund (EARF), commissioned the Basel Institute on Governance to conduct the research 
project “Corruption, Social Norms and Behaviours in East Africa” (hereafter “the Project”) aiming at 
shedding light into those “[behavioural] factors that influence the propensity for poor people to engage 
in, resist and report ‘corrupt transactions’” in three East African countries, namely Rwanda, Tanzania 
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and Uganda.1 The Project activities took place between January 2016 and August 2017 and involved 
two major components. 
The first component was a semi-systematic literature review (hereafter “the Literature Review”) (Stahl, 
Kassa, and Baez-Camargo 2017) and an accompanying Policy Brief (Baez-Camargo 2017) that compiled 
the evidence about the mechanisms whereby behavioural factors affect decision-making related to 
practices of petty corruption and assessed the relative effectiveness of anti-corruption interventions 
targeting petty corruption in developing countries.2  
The second component comprised field research activities exploring the commonalities and differences 
in behavioural influences on attitudes towards petty corruption across the three case study countries, 
focusing on the interactions between ordinary citizens and low-to-mid level officials.3 The field research 
findings have been integrated into three country reports with accompanying policy briefs and a 
synthesis comparative assessment distilling the implications of the research findings for anti-corruption 
practice and corruption research.4  
This report presents the main findings from the field research activities for the case of Tanzania 
conducted in collaboration with researchers from the University of Dar es Salaam. The study focused on 
the health and education sectors. The report is organised as follows: following this introduction, Section 
2 presents the research design, including the research rationale, the underlying conceptual framework, 
applied methods as well as limitations. Section 3 provides a general background of the Tanzanian 
context in terms of the experience in implementing anti-corruption policies and strategies and its 
relevance as a case study in the East Africa region. The main research findings are presented 
subsequently: Section 4 presents the main modalities of petty corruption practices that were identified 
in the course of the research activities. Section 5 discusses the findings associated with the impact of 
factors of sociality on attitudes towards petty corruption in the Tanzanian context. Section 6 is devoted 
to describing the findings related to how environmental heuristics and shared mental models shape the 
manner in which individuals make decisions on whether to engage in or abstain from acts of petty 
corruption. Section 7 elaborates conclusions on the relevance of behavioural factors for understanding 
petty corruption outcomes in Tanzania and discusses policy recommendations.  
 
                                                      
1
 Terms of Reference, Research on Corruption Social Norms and Behaviours in East Africa, published on 9 October 2015 by EARF (DFID).  
2
 Both documents are accessible on https://www.baselgovernance.org/publications/3623 and https://www.baselgovernance.org/ 
publications/3621respectively.  
3
 A complementary research project, entitled ‘Informal Governance and Corruption – Transcending the Principal-Agent and Collective Action 
Paradigms’, has been commissioned by DFID and the British Academy (BA) and implemented by the Basel Institute on Governance in 
collaboration with University College London (UCL) and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). Following an inductive approach – it 
looks at those norms and practices commonly employed by political and business elites. This top-down perspective seeks to uncover unwritten 
rules and behavioural patterns that articulate informal governance regimes associated with high prevalence of corruption. More information 
can be found on: www.britac.ac.uk/anti-corruption, www.britac.ac.uk/node/4660.  
4
 All documents are accessible on: https://www.baselgovernance.org/publications.  
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2 Research Design 
2.1 Rationale and conceptual approach 
A major contribution of this study is the advancement of anti-corruption practice and corruption 
research by empirically investigating the prevalence and impact of behavioural drivers of corruption. 
Behavioural drivers comprise quasi-rational and non-rational factors that are conducive to unfavourable 
corruption outcomes, including collective ways of thinking, mental shortcuts and cues, and socio-
cultural expectations. In contrast, non-behavioural drivers of corruption are based on rational 
assumptions of human behaviour and include economic, political, institutional and organisational 
factors. The presumption is that behavioural insights can be used to shape innovative anti-corruption 
policies to complement mainstream approaches (cf. Dolan et al. 2010, 8)5.  
As per the Terms of Reference for the Project, the conceptual approach that was adopted follows the 
three broad principles of human decision-making identified in the 2015 World Development Report 
(WDR) on ‘Mind, Society and Behaviour’: 
• ‘Thinking automatically’ refers to the propensity of people to make most judgments and 
choices automatically, rather than deliberatively. Individuals typically process imperfect 
information by resorting to shortcuts and reach decisions in response to frames (the way 
choices are presented), anchors (contextual aspects without direct relevance to a decision 
which nonetheless lead individuals to jump to conclusions and make rash decisions) or default 
options (modal patterns of behaviour prevailing in a given social context).  
 
• ‘Thinking socially’ recognises that people are enculturated into acting and thinking collectively.6 
Thus, social values, preferences, norms, identities and networks can exert a decisive influence 
on decision-making because people care about their surroundings and strive to align to what is 
perceived to be socially acceptable. Social determinants of individual choice often revolve 
around issues concerning status, respect, shame, and guilt.  
 
• ‘Thinking with mental models’ means that individuals in any given society share common 
perspectives and ideas through which they make sense of the world around them. In other 
words, decision-making relies on concepts, categories, identities, prototypes, stereotypes 
causal narratives and worldviews drawn from one’s environment. Mental models can refer to 
the macro level, where individuals share a collective vision of how things work around them, 
which might be shaped by factors such as history, ideology, religion and exposure to different 
types of institutions. Mental models can also apply to the micro level, where an individual’s self-
concept may consist of multiple identities, each associated with different norms that dictate 
adequate behaviours for different situations.  
In terms of definitions and operationalization of key concepts, a first recognition is that petty corruption 
is a highly multifaceted and fluid concept, which may comprise many different practices depending on 
the context (DFID 2015). As such, it may not easily be captured in a definition or formula (Ledeneva, 
                                                      
5
 Behavioural insights aim at improving development outcomes through a new generation of policies that are empirically grounded and ideally 
experimentally tested. According to the OECD, ‘behavioural insights’ is one discipline in a family of three, the others being behavioural science 
and behavioural economics – that, in addition to traditional economic strategies, use insights from psychology, cognitive science and other 
social science disciplines to unveil the workings of non-rational drivers of human behaviour. More information can be found on: 
www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/behavioural-insights.htm [1 August 2017]. 
6
 Enculturation refers to processes whereby individuals learn and internalise their group’s culture and social norms through repeated exposure, 
observation and experience, mostly during primary and secondary socialisation (Hoff and Stiglitz 2015), (Gavelek and Kong 2012).  
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Bratu, and Köker 2017; Torsello 2011). For this reason, and because the research specifically seeks to 
shed light into behavioural factors impacting attitudes towards petty corruption, a broad approach to 
studying petty corruption has been deemed most appropriate in order to capture the various manners in 
which individuals understand petty corruption and the practices associated with it in their local 
contexts.  
Therefore, the research focused on informal transactions (i.e. those that do not adhere to formal 
processes and rules) involving low to mid-level officials and ordinary citizens. Embracing a broad view 
was important in order to be able to capture the range of practices that have social and context-specific 
grounding that often blur the line between appropriate and inappropriate behaviours in the interactions 
between citizens and providers of public services.  
On the basis of this broad approach, practices of petty corruption were identified following 
Transparency International’s definition of petty corruption as the ‘everyday abuse of entrusted power by 
low- and mid-level public officials in their interaction with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to 
access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other 
agencies’ (Transparency International 2009). Thus, the definition utilised captures practices such as 
bribery and favouritism in the different forms they may take. It also captures what the World Bank 
(2010, p. 2) has labelled ‘quiet corruption’ – forms of petty corruption and malpractices of frontline 
providers (such as teachers, health service providers and public officials) that are “difficult to observe 
and quantify […], do not involve monetary exchange […], but whose impact on service delivery and 
regulation has adverse long-term effects on households.”  
2.2 Research design and methods 
The Project employed a comparative case study approach applied in six regions across the three case 
study countries with research activities in two regions per country (one urban and one rural area) as 
follows:  
• Urban areas: Kigali (Rwanda), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Kampala (Uganda) 
• Rural areas: Southern Province (Gisagara district) (Rwanda), Kagera region (Tanzania), and Northern 
Uganda (Acholi subregion) (Uganda)  
For each country, two public service sectors of key relevance were selected in consultation with DFID 
experts and local stakeholders: the health and education sectors for Uganda and Tanzania, as well as 
the police and health sectors for Rwanda.  
The methodology consisted of a sequential mixed-methods design comprising focus group discussions 
(FGDs), a vignette-based survey and participant observation. In some cases semi-structured interviews 
were also conducted to complement some of the research findings with the views from the responsible 
authorities.  
The choice of a qualitative methodology is grounded in the fact that, as the Literature Review revealed, 
the Project represents a pioneering study being one of the first efforts to collect empirical data that 
establishes the link between behavioural influences and corruption.7 The choice is also justifiable by the 
                                                      
7 To our knowledge Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel, (2017) for the case of Nigeria and the on-going project “Corruption in the Criminal 
Justice Sector” of the Flecther School at Tufts University [http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Institute-for-Human-Security/Research/Corruption] for 
the cases of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are the only other studies to have explicitly taken this approach to date. 
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 8 
primary aim of this research to accurately capture a broad range of manifestations of petty and ‘quiet’ 
corruption (cf. World Bank 2010). In this regard, the research activities, although guided by the findings 
from the Literature Review, were to a large extent exploratory given the scarcity of empirical evidence 
and analysis. Although an effort was made to quantify some of the findings through the implementation 
of a survey, given sampling and resource constraints the survey is meant to yield insights indicative of 
prevailing patterns and does not represent statistically significant national-level trends. Therefore, data 
analysis of the survey remained qualitative in nature. For both the FGDs and the survey a purposive 
sampling strategy was employed in order to maintain the focus narrowly aimed at the prospective 
beneficiaries of anti-corruption interventions.  
2.2.1 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
Three categories of FGDs were convened in the two research areas in Tanzania: 
Citizens/users: Comprising youth, women of child-bearing age (low income and middle class), young 
male adults (low income and middle class), elderly and disabled persons.  
Service providers: nurses, doctors, clinical officers and teachers. 
Management: Health staff with managerial tasks, Assistant District Medical Officers, School 
Headmasters, Assistant District Educational Officers, Village/Mtaa Executive Officers. 
The FGDs followed a protocol of prioritised topics relevant for the research and validated by the 
Project’s expert advisory group, testing for the prevalence of petty corrupt practices, as well as for the 
most relevant concepts appearing in the literature. The findings from the FGDs were subsequently used 
to revise and refine the survey instrument. 
2.2.2 Vignette-based survey  
The second research instrument is a vignette-based survey consisting of two components. In a first 
section, basic demographic information was gathered and respondents were probed on a variety of 
topics including prevalence of corruption in the chosen sectors, level of trust towards different public, 
political and social institutions, and prevalence of certain social norms and values in the respective 
communities.  
In the second section, fourteen ‘survey vignettes’ were developed in order to focus the inquiry into the 
key topics that were uncovered in the FGDs. 8 One of the main goals of the survey was to try to tease 
out whether there are differences in attitudes toward corruption depending on its intended outcome. 
Each ‘vignette’ describes a scenario or an instance representing one of four distinct types of corrupt 
practices, namely: 
• ‘Greasing the system’: expediting access to a service or resource one is entitled to 
• Obtaining access to a service or resource one is not entitled to  
• Avoiding a sanction 
• Personal enrichment 
                                                      
8
 This methodological vignette approach has been developed and tested by Sautu and colleagues (Sautu 2009, 2004, 2002) who developed a 
corruption tolerance index studying the propensity of the Buenos Aires middle-class to engage in corruption.  
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In the vignettes, a distinction was made on whether a corrupt action responds to the expectations and 
obligations associated with informal social networks. Survey respondents were divided into two groups: 
In the first group, the respondents were asked to rate the degree to which the action in question is of a 
corrupt nature. Ratings were made on a scale from 0 to 5 where 0 is not corrupt and 5 is maximum 
corruption. In the second group, the respondents were asked to rate the likelihood that they would 
engage in such behaviour. Ratings were made on a scale from 0 to 5 where 0 means “I would never do 
it” and 5 means “I would certainly do it”. These two modalities probe for what respondents believe is 
morally right or wrong and for what they would actually consider being involved in (on a more pragmatic 
basis). This distinction is relevant given the emerging insights regarding the ambivalent distinction 
between what is deemed to be correct and what is accepted as necessary in one’s own context. 
A total of 596 surveys were conducted across the three countries of which 204 were applied in Uganda 
(100 in the Gulu District and 104 in Kampala), 200 were applied in Tanzania (100 in Kagera region and 
100 in Dar es Salaam) and 192 were applied in Rwanda (94 in Gisagara district and 98 in Kigali).  
The purposive sample design included low income and middle class individuals in their 20s and 30s (to 
capture women in child-bearing age and parents of children attending public schools), elderly, and 
public sector workers. 
2.2.3 Limitations 
As has been mentioned earlier, it is important to underscore the pioneering nature of this research. As 
such, the research activities must be considered as exploratory and constituting a first step towards 
compiling empirical evidence on the nature of prevailing behavioural influences on the attitudes towards 
petty corruption among citizens in the three countries. Thus, the research findings seek to shed light on 
broad patterns characterising behaviours, choices, incentives, beliefs and understandings of citizens 
that impact prevailing levels of petty corruption in the sectors studied. However limited sample sizes 
signify that the findings are indicative and at best representative of the communities in which the 
research activities took place and are not statistically generalisable to the entire national context. 
Rather, the primary aim is to account for analytical generalisation (cf. Yin 2014, 1998) by cross-
comparing the results of the three case studies through a behavioural lens as stipulated by the 
conceptual framework (WDR). In order to validate the findings of the research, efforts have been made 
to corroborate the trends captured in the research with results from major surveys conducted at the 
national level, such as the East African Bribery Index 2017. However, while the research suggests that 
informal practices (such as favouritism and gift-giving) have a central role in shaping outcomes in the 
provision of public services, many of the behaviours documented have not been to date properly 
quantified by means of national level representative surveys. In this regard, the research findings should 
be interpreted as the output of a first-phase exploratory inquiry that draws the attention of practitioners 
to certain social dynamics and points to topics in need for further research.  
 
 




Tanzania has made the fight against corruption a top political priority since the adoption of the 1999 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP) under then-president Benjamin Mkapa.9 
Subsequent administrations, while vocal on their proclaimed commitment to anti-corruption, 
nevertheless managed to only achieve meagre results. However, the current government led by 
President John Magufuli has vowed to renew anti-corruption efforts since his election in 2015, taking 
significantly bold steps to tighten the rule of law and eradicate the corrupt cartels that have exerted 
inordinate influence over the country’s governance in the past.  
The challenges faced in reforming the Tanzanian state to achieve better control of corruption are 
significant because corruption has reached systemic levels in the country, pervading all aspects of 
public administration. Indeed, corruption has become a constant feature in the experience of Tanzanian 
citizens in their interactions with the state, especially when it comes to the delivery of public services, 
as well as in the broader public sphere, as attested by a significant number of reports. In 2016, 
Tanzania was placed at number 116 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index out of 
176 countries (with an overall score of 32). Other studies have documented large-scale political 
corruption, including political patronage and clientelism, as well as grand corruption in the mining and 
extractive industry sectors.10 In terms of petty corruption, public institutions most affected by bribery 
and other corrupt practices comprise the police (87%), the judiciary (86%), health services (79%), the 
civil service (75%) and the education system (74%) (Transparency International 2013). More recently, a 
survey conducted in 2017 by the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) in urban 
Tanzania (Dar Es Salaam and Mwanza) confirms that the most common and recurring practices of petty 
corruption are bribery (40.8%) and favouritism (15.1%) followed by sexual corruption (7%) and takrima 
(5.6%), understood as ‘traditional hospitality’ which involves reciprocal gift-giving (PCCB 2017).11 In the 
same survey 56.5% of urban citizens (from both genders) reported having been asked for a bribe, and 
36.4% actually admitted to having paid a bribe when accessing public services during 2016 (ibid. 20).  
The problem of endemic corruption in Tanzania has persisted in spite of the existence of a robust legal 
anti-corruption framework, which suggests a lack of political will to implement genuine reforms on the 
part of previous administrations. There is reason to believe that President Magufuli has an authentic 
determination to combat corruption (Sambaiga forthcoming 2018) which is reflected, among other 
actions, in the reform and empowerment of key law enforcement agencies (Zinnbauer and Martinez-
Kakutschka 2017). However, although credible political will is undoubtedly an essential precondition to 
bring about change, the path to transform a socio-political system where corruption has been the norm 
                                                      
9
 The Warioba report laid the foundation of NACSAP I in 1999 and the renewed and enhanced commitment of NACSAP II for 2008-11, by 
introducing reforms in government leadership and founding as well as strengthening several anti-corruption institutions, such as the 
Commission of Ethics, the Prevention and Combatting of Corruption Bureau and the instalment of a Minister of Good Governance.  
10
 See for example the U4 study on corruption in Tanzania (Lindner, S. 2014), available from https://www.transparency.org/files/ 
content/corruptionqas/Country_profile_Tanzania_2014.pdf and Norad (2011) for examples on incidences of high profile grand corruption 
scandals, available from https://www.oecd.org/countries/tanzania/48912823.pdf. In particular, the research by Gray H.S (2015) entitled 
‘The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania’ examines four major grand corruption scandals that occurred within public finance 
from 2000 until 2014 and links grand corruption to intra-elite conflicts within the ruling CCM party. The 2010-2011 Tanzania Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative report provides further background information to corruption dynamics in the extractive industry and reports 
that a net difference of 11 billion Tanzanian Shillings remains unresolved at the end of their reconciliation period. http://www.teiti.or.tz/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/third-report.pdf.  
11
 Note that the data stems from a 2017 baseline survey that with a relatively small sample size of 450 urban citizens focusses on Dar Es 
Salaam and Mwanza only, and is therefore not representative of the entire country. The aim of this project is to collect baseline data for a 
larger research endeavour aimed at developing contextually sensitised ‘home grown indicators’ able to capture local forms of corruption and 
measure anti-corruption intervention effectiveness. The indicated percentages in this report refer to the averaged relative frequencies from 
groups of respondents from both cities – and are at best indicative of national trends and attitudes. 
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to one where it becomes the exception is not necessarily obvious. Among the challenges President 
Magufuli faces is to compellingly engage society in transformative actions conducive to overcoming 
entrenched habits and beliefs while constructing new sustainable attitudes that promote the control of 
corruption.  
Although some of the measures undertaken by the current administration have generated national and 
international criticism on the grounds of being perceived as detrimental to essential democratic rights 
and civil liberties, it is nonetheless remarkable that President Magufuli’s promise to fight graft has 
received overwhelming support from Tanzanian citizens.12 In fact, expectations are high that this 
government will induce meaningful change that will result in better livelihoods for families and 
individuals. Thus, the current context provides a unique opportunity to harness the desire for 
improvement and promote a comprehensive anti-corruption agenda. In this sense, the Project has been 
undertaken with the belief that investigating behavioural factors that have fuelled corrupt practices in 
the past will yield important insights to help inform effective interventions that can support a holistic 
and evidence-based strategy to fight corruption in Tanzania. This report aims to make a meaningful 












                                                      
12
 A citizens’ assessment and expectations survey published in September 2016 reported that ‘96% of Tanzanians approve or strongly approve 
of President Magufuli’s performance since taking office’. The report is available from http://twaweza.org/uploads/files/PeoplesPresident-EN-
FINAL-A4.pdf. Numerous local and international media have reported on the popularity of President Magufuli. See for example the BBC’s 
profile of President Magufuli available from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34670983 and the NewAfrican’s analysis of ‘John 
Magufuli: Tanzania’s rising star’ http://newafricanmagazine.com/john-magufuli-tanzanias-rising-star/.  
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4 Characterising petty corruption and its 
modalities 
On the basis of the research findings, this section describes the different behaviours and practices 
associated with petty corruption that are said to be generally recurrent in Tanzania, with an emphasis 
on the health and education sectors. The evidence about the prevalence of such practices, the enabling 
circumstances in which they take place, and about the main victims and perpetrators is also discussed. 
4.1 Corruption in the interactions between service providers and users 
In both urban and rural areas, research participants concurred that access to public services typically 
cannot be attained in the time and quality desired without resorting to some form of informal action. 
When asked to describe how things normally unfold when applying for a service, for example obtaining a 
driver’s license, the respondents agreed that whether a user actually gets the license is a “matter of 
action”, meaning that even if the person presents all the required documents, it may still be necessary 
to pay a bribe in order to obtain the license. Additionally, FGD participants described that not meeting 
the official criteria to be eligible for the license is not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle to obtain 
the document provided a bribe is paid. Overall, the FGDs revealed a shared perception that accessing 
public services has little to do with formal rights and entitlements.  
The FGD discussions about the provision of services in the education and health sectors suggest that 
particularly health services are severely affected by high levels of petty corruption. This is further 
validated by the Project’s survey responses (see below) as well as by respondents surveyed in the PCCB 
research, who confirmed that the health sector is perceived as the second most corrupt sector (after 
the judiciary) – with 67.4% of respondents agreeing that health service institutions are to a large extent 
ridden by corruption. 
The perceived prevalence of corruption in the health sector among respondents in the Project’s survey 
is reported in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Is corruption prevalent in the health sector in Tanzania 13 
                                                      
13
















It seldom (rarely) 
happens
It never happens I do not know
Is corruption prevalent in the health sector? (%) 
Tanzania Rural Urban
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 13 
Plenty examples of challenges and irregularities were recounted in the FGDs while discussing access to 
health services, including a lack of work ethics, bribery, favouritism, long queues and poor quality of 
care and treatment. Overall, the ease of receiving medical care was described as a function of whether 
the patient knows the health provider in charge or whether the service seeker can afford a bribe.  
Overall, favouritism was considered a normal behaviour on the part of health workers under the informal 
premise that “relatives are considered first”. For instance, in cases of drug shortages, research 
participants perceived that resources tend to be prioritised for relatives and acquaintances of the 
providers. There was also strong agreement that bribery constitutes the most viable alternative to 
having a personal connection with the provider. In this sense, many perceive bribing as “buying one’s 
right”, a “shortcut” or a “means to an end” to overcome hurdles and receive a “simplified service 
delivery”. Respondents from both urban and rural settings emphasised that, because it is known that 
health services are hardly ever obtained only on the basis of formal entitlements, service users prepare 
themselves before coming to the service point. Thus, they may gather the financial resources in order to 
be able to offer a bribe, or may canvass their social networks to find “useful” employees who can assist 
in obtaining the services needed.  
Based on the research findings, ease of access to public health services can be understood as a 
“matter of closeness”. Interestingly, in both urban and rural settings there was a very similar 
appreciation of the manner in which public services are delivered selectively to different groups. In a 
first instance, a family member will receive the service in a prioritised fashion without any extra payment 
involved, even if this person is not entitled to the service. Next, friends will receive the service, whether 
they are entitled to it or not, but may be requested to pay a bribe. Expedited service can also be 
obtained if one has the right recommendation, which relates to the survey results where 45% of 
respondents thought that the best way to deal with problems with public service providers is to ask for 
help from an important person. Next come more distant acquaintances and even “opportunistic” 
contacts, consisting of individuals who establish a relationship with the provider by means of offering 
gifts or bribes. In fact, the perception that having some kind of relationship with the provider is 
necessary in order to access services results in the instrumental use of bribery on the part of users in 
order to establish a personal connection with the provider. Thus, unsolicited bribing and gift-giving on 
the part of users is a common occurrence and the research findings suggest that the amount of the 
bribe tends to increase, the more distant the relationship and the more urgent the situation. This means 
that people lacking financial means and personal connections are those who experience the greatest 
challenges in accessing public services. As a service user stated: “Money is everything nowadays, [if] 
you do not have money go stand in the queue”. 
The picture that emerges from the FGDs shows a pointedly regressive health system that, in spite of 
legal entitlements, actually works on the basis of personal contacts and the ability to pay, discriminating 
against the most vulnerable groups. Such state of affairs shapes individuals’ preferences and choices 
accordingly, which explains why research participants were of the view that, if resources are available, 
people prefer to seek medical treatment in private facilities. Previous research in low income areas of 
Dar es Salaam also indicated that low expectations regarding public health facilities spurred people to 
resort to traditional healers in an effort to attend to their health needs (Baez-Camargo and Sambaiga 
2016b). 
Regarding the education sector, FGD participants perceive that the schooling system in both rural and 
urban areas functions relatively well. The survey findings regarding the perceived levels of corruption in 
turn appear to corroborate that education performs better than health in this regard as shown in Figure 
2.  
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In particular, FGD respondents from the rural areas asserted that favouritism and bribing are rather the 
exception than the norm in the education sector. Participants see the reason for this in the fact that 
third parties monitor national exams, which prevents teachers from being directly involved. It also helps 
that all the bureaucratic procedures are well defined and undertaken by administrative secretaries. 
Similarly, in urban FGDs, respondents stated that there is no need to resort to corruption in the 
education sector because procedures are clear and if a person follows the existing formal procedures, 
then services are received without any challenges. In line with these positive sentiments, the survey 
results show that 70% of the respondents expressed having ‘high’ to ‘total’ trust in teachers.  
In spite of this general appraisal, there were also accounts that documented some ways in which 
corruption nonetheless happens in the education sector. For example, bribing can be used to enrol 
children into better schools or to improve their marks. Favouritism in education was also alluded to in 
cases where the relatives of the school staff receive first consideration in school enrolment in 
comparison to an unknown student. 
 
Figure 2: Is corruption prevalent in the education sector in Tanzania 14 
4.2 Corruption within the workplace 
The findings show that the situation in the workplace has a strong influence on the way service 
providers and seekers interact with one another. In this regard, the research findings indicate that in 
the health sector, corruption manifests itself in a first instance during the recruitment process. 
According to research participants, hiring decisions are often made on the basis of favouritism. As an 
urban FGD participant expressed, “health facilities in our community employ unprofessional health 
workers based on knowing each other”.  
Bribing is another way to get a job, as attested by a participant in the rural users FGD who shared the 
following experience: “I studied and have all the qualifications and certificates but, when I go for the 
interview, I have to give out something to be prioritised for the position.” Giving something is sometimes 
required just in order to be shortlisted for a job interview, whereas successfully getting through the 
interview may require yet another bribe. 
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Research participants were well aware of the fact that such practices result not only in unqualified 
employees, but also in deficient service provision. However, other negative consequences of favouritism 
were discussed that shed light into the systemic effects that corruption in recruitment processes 
generates. For example, when people get employed through people they know, the receiver of the 
favour will feel indebted to the job giver, thereby promoting behaviours that usually relegate the needs 
and satisfaction of service seekers to a secondary place. In fact, job related opportunities, such as 
attending workshops; trainings and promotions, often have more to do with displaying loyalty to one’s 
superiors than with performance on the job. In fact, some FGD participants explained that people get 
promoted if they tolerate or even accept the corrupt conduct of superiors; otherwise they can be 
ostracised or even fired for their integrity. A community participant in the rural FGD said that sometimes 
a person who has a high position in the office orders an employee to provide a favour to someone who 
is not entitled to it “but if you refuse to do it then you may lose your job or get demoted because you 
have disobeyed what your boss ordered you to do.”  
Corruption in recruitment therefore creates a work environment where other corrupt behaviours are 
propagated or at the minimum acquiesced as a result of the vertical informal relationships and peer 
pressures. In the long run, corrupt practices in the workplace can become highly entrenched and, as 
the Literature Review suggests, create embedded incentives related to pride, resentment or the desire 
to fit in that override any formal training on codes of conduct and values of integrity (Kahan 2003, Barr 
and Serra 2009).  
Some of the experiences of corruption among health staff confirm the findings of several experimental 
studies that suggest that indeed the work environment crucially determines what employees 
understand as acceptable and inacceptable behaviours (Barr and Serra 2009). This was illustrated by a 
service provider from the rural area who stated that “if medical assistants see work colleagues not 
issuing a receipt to everyone and hiding away the money received, then this behaviour influences others 
into not following the code of conduct at the workplace.” In such a context, the employee is “forced to 
perform poorly and corruptly due to peer pressure” the same participant concluded.  
4.3 Victims of corruption 
When discussing vulnerability and predispositions towards petty corruption, the most consistent themes 
arising in both the urban and rural FGDs revolved around gender issues. Participants in both areas 
considered women to be the group most vulnerable to petty corruption due to discriminatory attitudes 
around what a female participant called “our culturally perceived inferiority.”  
Participants from the urban setting stated that in all health facilities men or women accompanied by 
men are attended to first, allegedly on the basis of an unspoken understanding that, because the man 
has to work, he has to be prioritised in the provision of health services. Also, in the urban and rural 
FGDs with users, participants argued that women are especially vulnerable when they give birth, 
because this is a time when they can face life or death situations and as a consequence become easy 
victims to extortion, especially if they lack a social connection that can help them or they cannot afford 
a bribe. Some participants in the urban users’ group acknowledged the vulnerable position of women 
but for different reasons, namely that based on their role as mothers and caretakers they simply come 
more often in contact with the health system to receive antenatal care and by bringing children for 
check ups, immunisations as well as curative care.  
Participants from both settings stated further that women are prioritised in the service provision when 
they “contribute to an appreciation of the service through their bodies”. In fact, the question of sexual 
corruption emerged as a central topic in the research. Participants in both the rural and urban service 
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seekers FGDs agreed that giving a sexual bribe is the reality of how a woman caught in a difficult 
situation (e.g. a sick child in need of urgent medical attention) might obtain speedy access to medical 
treatment. Many comments were shared in this respect when discussing access to health services in 
the rural area: “she may provide something so that she may get the services, what she offers is different 
than in the case of a man.” It was recounted that service providers may ask a female service seeker for 
her telephone number so that she may provide a favour later. If the woman rejects such advances the 
consequences can be dire, as a FGD participant in the rural users group said: “I would say that her sex 
might be her downfall because of her principles”. 
The above findings reflect the prevalence of sextortion as one of the recurring manifestations of 
corruption in Tanzania, which confirms a trend that has been documented in reports by women’s rights 
organizations in the country. For instance, a report by the Tanzania Media Women’s Association 
(TAMWA) estimates that between 75 and 89% of women in Tanzania have experienced some form of 
sexual harassment or assault (as cited in Kambuga 2016). In particular, an analysis on the culprits of 
sextortion in the education system indicated that it is not unusual for teachers to solicit sex from their 
female students (Ibid.).15 In addition, the 2017 PCCB survey (2017, 22) indicates that sexual corruption 
is most prevalent in the Tanzanian capital (8.9%), where mostly women (12.7%) but also men (2.1%) 
have fallen victim to this type of criminal behaviour.  
In addition, because of the expectation that one needs money (or other bodily attributes) to bribe in 
order to get services, participants perceived poor people as the second social group most vulnerable to 
the impacts of petty corruption. FGD participants recounted how petty corruption hurts the groups that 
are most vulnerable even though they are given special protections under the law. For example, 
participants from both the urban and rural areas stated that the co-payment exemptions for vulnerable 
groups (children under five, the elderly and pregnant women) are typically not adequately implemented 
and that the system of health insurance cards has also been affected by petty corruption. In addition, 
the aforementioned vulnerable groups are often charged just to get registered in a book to receive 
services and may not even be treated with the right medicines, as one of the respondents stated. 
A rather concerning opinion was voiced in the rural area FGDs where community members shared that 
there is a feeling of impotence regarding corruption in public services, mainly because people are 
concerned about the negative consequences of denouncing corrupt perpetrators. One participant 
expressed “most of us are afraid of these public servants.” Pragmatically, this is partly because of 
limited available alternative options when it comes to social services like health and education (i.e. the 
presence of only a few private service providers and the inability of common citizens to afford these). 
Unwillingness to denounce is likely also linked to the social status that service providers command in 
their respective communities.  
4.4 The unwritten rules of the practice of bribing and favouritism 
The discussions with the different groups in the two areas yielded significant insights into the manner in 
which petty corruption takes place as well as the factors motivating individuals to engage in such 
practices. In particular, the research findings shed light into a marked ambivalence among participants 
in their attitudes towards corruption. Indeed, while most FGD participants recognised the negative 
consequences of corruption and strongly condemned it, the accounts they gave about the typical 
scenarios that one may encounter when accessing public services referred to examples of bribery and 
favouritism in a much more neutral, if not even positive, tone.  
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 In response to this situation, in 2011, the Tanzania Women Judges Association issued a toolkit entitled “Stopping the abuse of power for 
purposes of sexual exploitation: naming, shaming, and ending sextortion”. http://www.iawj.org/Tanzania_Toolkit__final_.pdf. 
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The research findings also inform as to how people resolve in practice this contradiction. In repeated 
occasions, research participants from all groups and regions brought up the importance of the creation 
of “environments” and “spheres of authority” at the point of service delivery as a preamble to an 
informal exchange. According to FGD users’ accounts, service providers create an environment 
“conducive to getting something” (kutengeneza mazingira), which amounts to a recognition that 
demanding a bribe is a sensitive matter, something illegal that the user may not give into willingly. The 
creation of an “environment” is therefore needed to indicate that resorting to bribing is the most 
rational, even necessary, course of action available under the circumstances. A typical example of the 
creation of such an environment is when the public official exaggerates the gravity of the situation the 
citizen finds him or herself in, often by recourse to the high costs that would be incurred should the 
legal path be strictly followed. The dire situation is then set in contrast to the much better solution that 
can be achieved informally.16 These actions help create a situation where a special exception should be 
made, which in turn requires some form of recompense to the provider who is willing to grant the 
favour. 
Service seekers gave other examples of the manner in which a “propitious environment” may be 
created: providers delay the service, pretend not to hear, act angry or even send the service users 
home to get additional documents. All these actions are intended to create a setting where the user 
becomes convinced that the only way to receive the service is by offering a bribe. A service provider 
explained: “when he comes today they will ask him to come tomorrow, when he goes tomorrow he will 
be asked to come the day after tomorrow just to get in his pockets.” Service providers also solicit 
bribes through metaphors and special expressions, for example indicating that seekers need to pay for 
“using the pen (kulipia kalamu)” or “for a stamp (kulipia muhuri)”.  
The FGD findings show that service users also proactively apply their own strategies to find solutions to 
their problems. A participant in the rural users’ FGD discussed the options for somebody who needs to 
obtain a license but does not have all the necessary documents: “If he is not qualified, he will create an 
environment or create network to bribe.” Sometimes creating such an environment means setting up 
the conditions to exchange money discreetly, as a rural service provider noted: “If he [the service 
seeker] visits you, then he is trying to create an environment.” Other times will involve appealing to pity 
of the service provider – “some of them will even provide excuses like ‘my house burnt down.’” Yet 
other times it may involve “showing off” one’s status as a strategy to get prioritised. As one participant 
mentioned, health workers would look at people’s appearances in an attempt to determine the 
economic situation of the relatives of the sick before treating the patient.  
It is meaningful that participants also referred to unsolicited gift-giving as a means to establish a 
personal relationship with the provider. However, whether the service provider will accept the gift is not 
always straightforward. Thus, the service seeker may need to create an adequate environment, for 
instance by sharing their problems with the provider, sometimes even bringing their children along to 
show their desperate need of the service in order to become close and create a connection with the 
service provider on the basis of appealing to solidarity and empathy. Finally, service seekers also use 
specific expressions suggesting a bribe may be offered such as “I will find you later (ntakutafuta 
baade)”, “just do it I will give you transport” (ntakupa nauli kidogo) or “I will refund the disturbances” 
(kidogo ya usumbufu).  
                                                      
16
 Interestingly, this strategic creation of an ominous environment on the part of the public official is a practice that occurs around the world 
as a prelude to the exchange of a bribe. See for example the case of the “mordida” (slang term for bribe) in Mexico (Baez Camargo 2016) and 
the many other illustrative examples compiled by Prof Alena Ledeneva in the Encyclopaedia of Informality (http://in-formality.com/).  
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From the service providers’ point of view the situation was explained by a rural teacher in the following 
terms: “when we go back to the rules and regulations of the job, then [you realise] you have broken 
some of the rules but you have done it due to your conscience, those who gave you something have the 
right to be served because its’ not written on the contract that one has to pay after receiving services 
so I think it’s just being human.” Bringing in the perspective of service providers sheds light into the 
complexity of the socially embedded transactions that take place at the service point. Service providers 
from the rural areas mentioned that when confronted with an unsolicited gift, one has to assess where 
the service user is “coming from” and what relation he or she has with you, which problems this person 
has to face, as well as the potential complications that might emerge from establishing a relationship 
with this person.  
Furthermore, in the FGDs with service providers from both the health and education sectors, research 
participants discussed how they are increasingly bound by the formal standards of public service 
delivery that are strongly enforced by the new government. In this regard, the extracts below from the 
FGD with service providers provide critical further insights: 
“[Now] we are working and following the set procedures and rules, therefore [favouring] the social 
networks is not allowed, you just support a person on the basis of his or her needs.”  
“ [I]t doesn't matter if you know me or not. Therefore everyone has access to good service, [now] we 
solve the challenge by applying the concept of first come, first served. It may happen that I was sitting 
here and a person entered, I can not ask the first one to wait because there is a person I know standing 
outside, I would just tell [my acquaintance] to wait for his time.” 
“If you're in the office like this and you decide to go by common sense, you will be stuck because there 
are lots of challenges and people would use the difficult circumstances to extract a favour.... A person 
may come to your office because he knows you, [but] he is just finding a shortcut to accomplish his goal. 
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5 Socially-embedded drivers of 
corruption: the role of social norms and 
networks  
Social norms and values can be understood as standardised generalisations concerning expected 
modes of behaviour among community members and therefore represent an important source of 
guidance on how to act in particular situations. Repeated social interactions and extended exposure to 
a given social structure leads to certain behavioural patterns becoming internalised and normalised, 
thereby forming collective social norms and practices (World Bank 2015; Hoff and Stiglitz 2015). In 
environments where high levels of corruption prevail, practices of petty corruption, including bribery and 
gift-giving, may therefore be perceived as the norm, and as such, become socially accepted and even 
prescribed (Lindner 2014; Banuri and Eckel 2012; Jackall 1988; Anders 2002; Anders 2005). In fact, 
individuals in such contexts may come to consider petty corrupt practices as either the way things are 
done or even as beneficial if direct personal benefits are derived (cf. Stahl, Kassa, and Baez-Camargo 
2017).  
In this section we present the findings associated with the social context and the manner in which 
accepted norms and values shape behaviours linked to the prevalence of petty corruption in Tanzania. 
A salient topic that emerges from the research findings links reported experiences with petty corruption 
to informal social networks, their functional and structural attributes, the social dynamics they 
reinforce, as well as the costs and tensions they generate.  
5.1 Social networks: solidarity and reciprocity as effective resources for problem-solving 
In the comparative discussion about the centrality of social networks in East Africa it is important to 
make a conceptual clarification. Whereas it is clear that individuals belong to multiple, overlapping 
networks anywhere, the type of networks that are emphasised in this Project are those to which the 
individual feels bound by obligations that are primordial because they are enforced and sanctioned by 
stringent social controls. Those networks are the social equivalent to what the political sciences refers 
to as the leader’s ‘winning coalition’ (Mesquita et al. 2005), meaning those constituencies whose 
support is most essential for maintaining legitimacy in the case of the political leader, and status and 
social recognition in the case of the individual. The networks understood in this manner are also 
interchangeably referred to as cliques, which is the subset of individuals in a wider network in which 
actors are more closely and intensely tied to one another,17 or as reference group (following Koni-
Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel 2017). 
In both urban and rural settings, research participants confirmed what key studies in the region have 
posited about the importance of social networks in the lives of Tanzanians (Hyden 1980). Individuals are 
invariably linked to multiple social networks, starting with the family and close friends, but also 
extending to other groups such as school classmates, neighbours, parishioners and so on. They can be 
formed by peers or have a hierarchical nature, as is often the case with networks found in the 
workplace.  
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 See http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C11_Cliques.html [25 August 2017] 
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Social networks may be constructed on the basis of specific criteria of group affiliation such as kin, 
profession, gender, or ethnicity (Anders 2002), but the research suggests that criteria may also be fluid, 
linking up individuals that are increasingly far removed from each other. These social networks are 
founded on the basis of trust and reciprocity-based relationships marked by a profound sense of 
belonging and moral obligation towards the group. Furthermore, social networks are key in our research 
as by highlighting the behaviours expected from their members as well as the degree of adherence to 
the unwritten rules that bind the networks together; we can shed light into the social norms and values 
prevailing in the communities.  
The findings show that informal social networks are socially imperative and regarded as essential 
because they represent powerful mechanisms to access resources, resolve problems and improve 
livelihoods. Pragmatically, the networks represent an effective means to obtain a ‘simplified’ service 
delivery. Thus, the importance ascribed to the networks is related to their functionality, whereby social 
relationships based on trust, reputation and reciprocal obligations effectively provide an informal safety 
net in a context characterised by resource scarcity and weak institutional capacity of the public sector. 
In fact, social ties reduce uncertainty when formal criteria and formal rights cannot be relied upon. 
Social networks are highly regarded because they perform a function similar to that of a currency. 
Having a broad network grants power and respectability, especially when the network involves 
connections with public officials. Furthermore, people often invest in social networks with the 
expectation of accruing certain benefits at a later stage. For instance, in reference to a son’s education, 
one female participant stated: “we usually expect that by educating our kids, after they graduate and 
get good jobs they [will] return back the favour by taking care of their families and the community in 
general.” The same was echoed in the FGD with urban service seekers as remarked by one male 
participant, “in our communities most of the people are poor and you have attained your education 
through people’s contribution so you are obliged to reciprocate.” As a rural service provider 
commented, this expectation is also present in the interactions with users: “[the service seekers] will 
start building a relationship with you by giving you gifts. It’s like investing in you, therefore they expect 
to be given priority when they need something.”  
These considerations about the obligations towards one’s group reflect strongly held social values and 
are even reflected in some of the traditional sayings proclaimed by rural participants in this research: 
"Eofisi etainamu wawe eb'ekomile versus 'Eofisi einamu owawe eb'ekingwiile lit.” (“An office without your 
relative in it is closed” whereas “An office with your relative in it is always open"). These values and 
beliefs exemplify why community members strive to have members of their network in the office and 
why, when this is not the case, they are prepared to give a bribe in order to establish the link that will 
facilitate access to services. Thus, social networks are often constructed instrumentally to incorporate 
“useful friends” in the form of service providers or other individuals who, due to their positions, can 
facilitate access to services and resources or open doors to employment and other opportunities.  
As the preceding discussion suggests, the research findings indicate that social ties among Tanzanians 
are characterised by a clear understanding of mutual obligation. In this regard, the family naturally 
represents the closest social network and the one generating the most stringent moral imperatives.  
Indeed, the research findings confirm that, when it comes to the family, the duty to help and provide for 
one’s relatives is an essential, unquestionable premise of social life in Tanzania. As expressed by a 
health sector district official: “it’s not that we have a lot of money to help five or six relatives, but […] 
whatever you get you share with others.” A rural area service provider similarly said: “[…] there are 
always family members who will be depending on you, their thoughts will be that because you are 
employed then you can provide assistance in one way or another.”  
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The obligation to help the family is understood as obvious; it does not need be articulated explicitly. A 
rural service provider stated the underlying principle succinctly: “you will help that person because it’s 
your blood.” Correspondingly, there is an expectation on the part of family members about having an 
inalienable entitlement to partake of the gains of a next of kin, as is implicit in the following comment 
from a FGD participant:  
“This young man (who doesn’t support his family/community) we can say that he did not plan his life well 
because we know that when he goes to work in the government he gets a salary at the end of the month” 
These considerations are strongly associated with collectively held values of solidarity and exert a 
powerful influence over decision-making in every sphere of life.  
The duty to help certainly extends to members of other networks. In fact, the practice of mutual help to 
social networks beyond the family is effective at problem-solving and pooling resources because it 
relies on a reciprocal exchange of favours, goods and resources, which in turn is closely associated with 
collectively held ideas about justice in social relations. In a previous study, we found that community 
members in low income areas in Dar es Salaam define a fair social exchange in terms of “something for 
something and nothing for nothing,” suggesting that reciprocity is a strongly held value (Baez-Camargo 
and Sambaiga 2016). Thus, the reciprocal exchange is a cornerstone of sociality in Tanzania.  
The endurance of the social relationships built upon this transactional logic hinges on two mutually 
reinforcing circumstances: on the one hand, informal networks foster indebtedness on the part of the 
recipient of the favour, on the other hand, the giving party holds an entitlement to be refunded or 
compensated in one way or the other. Both factors shape the behavioural patterns of individuals and of 
the networks themselves. “There is a reciprocal relationship meaning today you have helped me, so 
tomorrow I must find a way to return the favour”, as one participant described it. Therefore, building a 
network instrumentally beyond the innermost circles of family and close friends involves developing and 
consolidating relationships precisely on the basis of reciprocity. Furthermore, when someone is helped, 
the expectation about returning the favour is held not just by the recipient of the favour but also by all 
others closely related to him or her. In this way, the networks expand very easily and widely, while 
simultaneously generating a reciprocal burden on the ones being helped and their relatives.  
Interestingly, the survey results show that these feelings of moral obligations towards members of the 
social network are experienced differently according to the location and age of the respondents. 
Indeed, the survey responses suggest that that the obligation to reciprocate favours received from 
friends and acquaintances is felt more strongly by respondents in the rural over urban area; and more 
strongly by respondents under the age of 30 in comparison to respondents over the age of 30.18  
Because solidarity and reciprocity are deeply regarded values in Tanzanian society, we can infer that 
social norms such as gift-giving strongly shape behaviours and choices of individuals (see: Hyden 1980; 
Grodeland, Koshechkina, and Miller 1998; de Sardan 1999; Chang, Chang, and Freese 2001). In 
practice, transactional relationships are sustained on the basis of not only trust but also on reputation. 
An unwritten social norm is that one should not disavow the responsibilities (or debts) acquired when 
                                                      
18 This was reflected in the responses related to the description of an individual that feels obligated to reciprocate every favour received from 
friends and acquaintances. Overall, the respondents in Tanzania related to this description most often as ‘not at all like me’ (26%), but in the 
rural Bukoba District respondents related to this description most often as being ‘very much like me’ (31%) in comparison to respondents in 
Dar es Salaam who rated this most often as ‘not like me’ (38%) and respondents under the age of 30 rated this description most often as ‘like 
me’ (29%) and the respondents over the age of 30 most often as ‘not at all like me’ (29%). 
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receiving a gift or a favour from others, which means that not reciprocating favours or gifts received can 
be punished with gossip, shaming and even social isolation. 
5.2 Social networks and corruption 
The research findings illustrate how informal social networks based on relationships of reciprocity 
seamlessly extend beyond the private realm, penetrating the public sphere. As a consequence, social 
networks can be associated with the incidence of a variety of corrupt behaviours. In fact, the findings 
from both rural and urban FGDs emphasise how social obligations play a key role in framing the manner 
in which duty bearers, their families, associates and society at large understand the expected 
behaviours associated with holding a governmental position. In this light, public sector employment 
becomes a resource for immediate problem-solving for the people associated with the public servant, 
which in turn explains the prevalence of favouritism in the provision of public services in Tanzania. 
As has been mentioned above, the degree of proximity to the service provider is a strong determinant of 
the quality of treatment received. In the users’ FGDs, participants considered a scenario in which a 
service provider is approached by a relative requesting a favour. Overwhelmingly, the conclusion was 
that the provider has no choice but to give the relative what he or she wants; it is an obligation. Even if 
it would be a request for a drivers’ licence and the relative had none of the necessary documents or 
qualifications to be eligible to apply for it, the consensus among the discussants was that the document 
would be issued simply out of the obligation to the next of kin. One participant from the urban area 
elaborated on how family obligations override legal prescriptions saying that for him, as a policeman, it 
is impossible to bring his relatives into custody even if the law requires him to do so.  
These observations highlight an important issue: the research data suggests that in the 
conceptualisation and the practice of the separation of private and public realms, the boundaries are 
extremely blurred, if not inexistent, allowing family influences to override the public duty and conferring 
a prebendal logic to the exercise of public office. The practical irrelevance of the distinction between 
private obligation and official duty points to the social roots that account for the prevalence of practices 
such as nepotism and neopatrimonalism that have been recurrent in Tanzania. 
Beyond the family, a pattern emerges where people seek the assistance and solidarity of the social 
network for receiving services. As one participant put it: “I will ask myself if I know an employee from 
the TRA [Tanzania Revenue Authority] or I ask my friend if he knows someone from TRA to help me to 
get those documents.” As was mentioned before, friends and acquaintances will tend to receive 
preferential treatment, although they may still be asked to pay a bribe.  
The fact that service providers may also ask friends for bribes underscores the extent to which a bribe 
is not seen necessarily as an expression of abuse of power but rather as something entirely normal; a 
necessary fee for quicker service. This is important because the evidence from the research indicates 
that, while having a personal connection with a service provider opens the door to the possibility to get 
a favourable treatment, exchanging a bribe ultimately makes the transaction a fair one. This 
understanding about the fairness that underpins the social interaction means that words are sometimes 
not even needed to solicit the exchange. As a rural teacher elaborated:  
“We are really facing a difficult time because when a person comes needing your services, explaining 
their distress, you help that person but you have to remember that you are not that well off, and you 
won’t tell that person that you need something directly to provide your services, what happens is that you 
will help them and then they themselves will feel that they need to give you something for the services 
you provided.” 
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While the statement above illustrates the reality on the side of the teacher; similar considerations are 
embraced by community members who will acknowledge that 'teachers are poor' and therefore will 
bring something to give to the teacher after the service is provided.  
Equally, a health provider in an urban FGD confirmed the proactive engagement that service users feel 
obliged to pursue in relation to service providers. He noted, 
“…I am often called by people on Sunday, I'm telling them that I can't attend them because I am not on 
duty, but they insist saying please ‘I will refund the disturbance’ or ‘a bus fare’… and it commonly happens 
that you are given one hundred thousand in an area where you can only use five hundred for transport”. 
As for an individual that is not connected to the service provider in any way, the FGD participants 
agreed that this person will surely be asked for a bribe but may not necessarily get what he or she 
wants. This reinforces the idea that social networks take the function of a currency of sorts and that 
those lacking them are among the most vulnerable because of their disadvantaged position when it 
comes to the feasibility of accessing public services. 
Analysing the effect of social networks on public sector performance from the perspective of service 
providers helps to identify the roots of practices of nepotism, favouritism and bribing in service 
provision as well as in recruitment practices. Service providers from the urban areas lamented their 
experiences with a poor working environment, especially in regards to incentives and opportunities for 
promotion. One participant complained that “…one of the ways to get promoted, at least until recently… 
was to know someone (kujuana) …no matter how hardworking you are, you will still need to have 
someone who is familiar to you in order to get a promotion.” The sentiment was reiterated by another 
participant, “…it has been difficult because there are many cases where people work hard but they are 
not promoted”. 
Adopting the perspective of users complements the picture since proactive bribing is a widely used 
strategy to co-opt service providers into one’s network. Thus, the bribe should not be necessarily 
understood as a one-off transaction but as a means to establish a relationship and, subsequently, as 
part of an on going exchange following the logic of the social networks and the rules that bind them 
together. 
This is also why gift-giving is often seen as a way to begin a relationship and a strategy often used by 
service users who want to establish a personal link to the provider. In fact, as will be discussed below, 
the difference between a gift and a bribe is not necessarily straightforward. This is related to the high 
value that is socially ascribed to reciprocity, which also explains why providers find it difficult to reject 
such gifts. Thus, because it is rooted in tradition, rejecting the gift can offend the giver and create a 
precedent whereby the provider is criticised. Moreover, the social values of the gift and the reciprocal 
logic of “something for something” validate the actions of providers when they request “takrima” (a 
favour or hospitality). This was evidenced in the survey, where respondents were most often of the 
opinion that it is not corrupt for a teacher ‘to hint parents at the desirability of making a “voluntary” 
contribution to ensure children receive passing marks’.  
Social pressures may also be associated to more extortive modalities of bribing and even 
embezzlement. This can happen when the possibilities for material redistribution that a provider’s salary 
allows do not adequately meet the expectations of their networks. This was vividly narrated to two of 
the authors in an interview with a medical doctor who explained that people widely believe that holding 
a medical degree is associated with a high salary, but that is drastically contradicted by the reality of 
the prevailing low wages in the Tanzanian public health sector. Nonetheless, doctors face the pressure 
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to live up to the expectations of their families, whose effort in most cases was crucial to get them 
through medical school, which further exacerbates the risks of engaging in illegal actions such as 
bribery and embezzlement to supplement one’s income.  
In this regard, the survey shows what might be potentially interesting differences between rural and 
urban settings in the social acceptability of corrupt behaviours linked to family obligations. Respondents 
were asked to rank how corrupt it would be for a nurse to resell stolen medicines in the black market to 
pay for the wedding of her daughter. Whereas the majority of rural respondents (78%) ranked this as 
“maximum corruption”, the majority of urban respondents (69%) considered this to be not corrupt or 
minimally corrupt. A similar pattern emerged in another related question that involved bribe solicitation 
by a nurse in order to pay for a child’s school fees. In this case, 85% of rural respondents considered 
this to be very corrupt to maximum corrupt whereas 54% of urban respondents considered this to be 
not corrupt or minimally corrupt.  
5.3 The ambivalence of social networks 
As has been discussed, social networks are regarded as valuable resources because they provide 
access to services, resources and are useful in coping with the challenges of life. Practices of petty 
corruption become normalised because the transactional logic of the social networks seamlessly 
penetrates the public sector to the extent that it could be said that they informally regulate the 
provision of public services. This contributes to socially regressive outcomes because, while networks 
are effective informal social safety nets that help in pooling resources for the benefit of the in-group, 
they are exclusive and usually associated to groups with moderate to high incomes. The evidence 
shows that access to resources is needed from the onset in order to build, command and sustain the 
loyalty of a network. The FGD data shows, for instance, that the knowledge that access to service is 
challenging induces people to prepare before going to the health facility by either gathering money or 
mobilising their networks. The data also shows that people strategically decide on who are valuable 
people to be added to their networks and that such determinations often inform whether a bribe is 
offered or taken. These considerations underscore the fact that people lacking connections to the 
relevant providers and without the necessary financial means to build a network are excluded from the 
benefits of such informal safety nets and are therefore even more vulnerable to extortive bribing, low 
accessibility of public services and overall deficient state performance. 
In addition, the research also reveals insights about the tensions and costs associated with the 
widespread reliance on networks. Such tensions are most strongly felt by providers of public services, 
who find themselves at the crossroads between the social norms and expectations of their social 
networks and the formal rules and obligations associated with their public duties. Thus, when 
confronted with unsolicited gift-giving, the provider must determine the costs and benefits from 
accepting such a gift with regards to multiple normative frameworks. On the one hand are the social 
considerations that influence this decision-making process. As a service provider stated, if a gift is 
refused, people would take it negatively, would not recommend the service provider and may even 
speak badly of him or her. Accepting the gift, on the other hand, pleases people and can even provide 
an income supplement, especially given the fact that “reasonable” providers get recommended across 
networks. The ambivalence of the networks is in that the income supplement comes at the cost of 
acquiring a heavy load of responsibilities vis-à-vis an increasing number of informal clients, all of whom 
demand and expect privileged treatment. In the research, service providers often shared that they felt 
overwhelmed and apprehensive for being subjected to numerous and conflicting expectations of family 
and informal social networks. 
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Adding to the pressures that service providers experience is the increased tightening of law 
enforcement under the current administration, which means that the opportunity space to engage in 
practices of bribery and favouritism with impunity is shrinking. This exacerbates the tensions between 
the demands of the formal and informal normative frameworks to which the service providers are 
expected to respond. One participant in the service providers’ FGD explained that they “only employ 
you as an individual and not as a family. However, they [the family] do not understand such a thing […] 
they do not know the regulations the employed have to follow.” Another participant reflected that “The 
community has not yet been educated […] therefore, for them to realize that the service provider is on 
strict rules and that there is no side money, may take some time.” 
5.4 Respectability, status and shame: enforcement of informal norms 
Status, respect, shame, guilt, reputation and other socially reinforced normative constraints are 
critically important social variables in either deterring or fuelling corrupt behaviours (Baez-Camargo and 
Sambaiga 2016a; Dong, Dulleck, and Torgler 2009; Fjeldstad, Kolstad, and Lange 2003; Fjeldstad 
2005; Gatti, Paternostro, and Rigolini 2003; Heilman and Ndumbaro 2002; Kindra and Stapenhurst 
1998). In Tanzania, the research has found that social network dynamics, expectations and demands 
play a central role in how those normative concepts are constructed.  
The evidence from the FGDs indicates that there are two preponderant social norms that profoundly 
affect patterns of behaviour and decision-making among Tanzanian citizens. These social norms are: 1) 
the obligation to contribute to the social network’s welfare, and 2) the duty to reciprocate favours and 
gifts received. Crucially, the social norms are recognised as binding by most people, not just because of 
a personal conviction that they are morally correct imperatives, but also because the adherence to the 
social norm is socially enforced by means of rewards and punishments. Those positive and negative 
incentives are associated to social status, respect and reputation as well as with shame and isolation, 
which play a highly effective role in enforcing social controls. 
Research participants strongly shared the view that if a service provider were to consistently fail to 
favour a relative in the service provision or reject bribes or gifts from an acquaintance, such behaviours 
would destroy this person’s social standing. In fact, not helping the community is understood as 
misusing the position for personal gain (akajanga); a perception of such a person emerges as:  
• “ [having] forgotten himself and where he is coming from” 
• “ [having] a cold heart”, 
• “[not having] planned his life well and set his life goals wrong.” 
Consensus in the FGDs was that such selfish behaviour would in the end affect most trust-based 
relationships. The consequences of what is deemed asocial behaviour range from shaming, destroying 
personal reputation and social exclusion to even physical threats and bodily harm. In the rural FGDs 
participants even suggested that the provider who does not provide favours to family and friends will be 
“isolated by his relatives and society” or, in extreme cases, might even “be assassinated.” 
Conversely, FGD participants were also asked about the social consequences when a provider favours 
members of the same social group and accepts bribes to speed up the service provision for in-group 
members and friends. The responses included statements such as: 
• “society will love him and even recommend people to him for fast services” 
• “people will try to build good relationships with him and he would be respected and gain prestige.”  
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 26 
Several other aspects of the discussions confirmed the same patterns of status recognition. Research 
participants were asked who would be most accepted in the community, whether a government 
employee who is loyal and works hard but has not enough income to help family or friends, or a 
government employee who uses his position to enrich himself and help his friends with their problems. 
In both urban and rural FGDs all participants agreed that the second person would be more respected 
in the society.  
Therefore, social status is closely associated to the extent that a person is perceived to be acting with 
“compassion”, whose actions involve “sharing” and “supporting” others, as the following two remarks 
made by FGD participants further illustrate: 
….one who uses his position to enrich himself and using his income to help his/her relatives, is more 
accepted and respected to the community…… because in our community most of the people are poor 
and you have attained your education through people’s contribution…..(Female participant_FGD_Urban) 
So, for example, you are living in Chanika and your son is in town but he always sends money without you 
knowing where he gets the money but the one with good conducts and who abides by the rules never 
sends you money, who is worth [more] to you?......The one who sends me money…. (Male participant 
_FGD_ Urban) 
Thus, the FGD data as well as several of the survey results discussed above illustrate the practical 
relevance of the social norms and suggest that they reinforce the social acceptability of certain corrupt 
practices when they are associated with a redistribution of resources in favour of the social networks. 
This further indicates that, from the perspective of service providers, the decision to adhere to formal 
rules and regulations is significantly influenced by the expected costs from failing to fulfil the social 
networks’ expectations concerning the duty of the public servant to ‘give back’ to the community.  
A last, but important consideration, is that the research findings suggest that social status is not 
something inherent, it can be won or lost and, in the economy of favours, one must continuously take 
action in order to improve or, at the minimum, maintain one’s ‘good’ status. Furthermore, it must be 
noted that certain corrupt behaviours and practices are associated with respect and status but only to 
the extent that they are seen as involving acts of generosity that tend to the needs of one’s social 
group. Thus, one that continuously asks for bribes is not acclaimed, but is rather perceived as greedy 
and selfish as the communitarian beneficial purpose is not followed. These insights suggest entry points 
to address anti-corruption following a more nuanced approach that acknowledges the social 
considerations that affect individuals’ willingness to reject or agree to acts of petty corruption and the 
need to account for the locally held normative views of what is acceptable behaviour and what is not. 
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6 Automatic Thinking and Mental 
Models: shared ideas and self-fulfilling 
prophecies  
Behavioural studies emphasise the importance of automatic thinking, which is the propensity to make 
judgments and choices automatically, rather than deliberatively. Thus, decisions may respond to the 
presence of frames, which refer to the way choices are presented (e.g. as a loss or a gain). Automatic 
thinking can also be associated to anchors, which are contextual aspects that have no direct relevance 
to a decision but that nonetheless affect judgement, leading individuals to jump to conclusions on very 
partial views of the problem. Choices may also be made on the basis of default options, which comprise 
the modal patterns of behaviour prevailing in any given social context.  
Another key behavioural principle postulates that individuals’ decision-making is influenced by the 
mental models prevailing in their culture (World Bank 2015). Mental models refer to categories and 
stereotypes that people use to make sense of the world and to shape their views. Mental models are 
also relevant to the extent that they shape the roles of different societal actors on the basis of what 
those actors believe is expected of them (Ibid). Shared images and ideas about social roles – including 
what constitutes being a ‘good’ politician, service provider and public official - determine how people 
come to expect themselves and others to behave in different situations (Kotzian, 2011). These 
collective images legitimise behaviours that may have no correlate to formal roles and legal mandates, 
thus opening the way for illicit actions to be tacitly tolerated and even accepted. 
This section explores the impact of automatic thinking and mental models on the predispositions 
towards petty corruption in Tanzania.  
6.1 Narrow frames: perceptions about the prevalence of corruption in Tanzania 
As discussed in the Literature Review (Stahl, Kassa, and Baez-Camargo 2017), one of the modalities in 
which automatic thinking takes over the rational mind is through the power of frames, whereby our 
choices and behaviours are affected by what are perceived to be the normal, generalised patterns of 
action adopted by others around us. In this regard, a significant number of studies suggest that in highly 
corrupt environments - where everybody else is perceived as highly corrupt and where corruption is 
perceived to be the norm, individuals have a heightened propensity to engage in corruption. In such 
contexts, individuals tend to justify illicit actions by automatically presupposing that corruption ‘is 
simply the way things are done’ and that ‘everybody else is doing it’ (cf. Kahan 2003; Mauro 2004; 
Dong, Dulleck, and Torgler 2009; Barr and Serra 2009; Kotzian 2011; Carson 2013; Pfeiffer and Rose 
2014; Zaloznaya 2014). Naturally, this effect can lead to the large-scale collective reproduction of 
corruption and associated practices.  
In Tanzania, as in many other countries where corruption is a systemic challenge, the research findings 
suggest that corruption and bribery are perceived as being the norm rather than the exception among 
service users. As participants stated, the possibility of being asked for a bribe always exists and a 
person who accepts a bribe is considered to be behaving as a “normal person.” Also, suggestive of the 
perceived institutionalisation of corruption is the notion shared by research participants that public 
services cannot be accessed without recourse to bribery or favouritism.  
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 28 
The perception that corruption is inescapable in Tanzania was also reflected strongly by urban survey 
respondents as Figure 3 shows. Interestingly, rural respondents more often strongly disagreed with 
such a perception. 
 
Figure 3: Is corruption inescapable in Tanzania?  
Most FGD participants shared the perception that corruption is so pervasive that it even penetrates the 
institutions of law enforcement. In particular, the police force is regarded as highly corrupt and 
participants from the urban areas also expressed that the PCCB has failed to address petty corruption 
at the local level. The perceived ineffectiveness of law enforcement agencies is associated with the 
belief that impunity is the norm. This confirms and reinforces the mental model that corrupt actions are 
the dominant, most effective route to “get things done” and, therefore, the most reasonable behaviours. 
The result is that, in spite of awareness about the negative consequences of corruption, practices of 
favouritism and bribery are rationalised and justified in several ways. For instance, service users viewed 
practices of petty corruption positively (whether by means of activating the social network or bribing) as 
strategies to obtain the service they want in an expedited fashion because, as one participant stated: 
“Tanzanians don't want procedures, we like shortcuts.”19  
These insights suggest that addressing corruption involves paying attention, not just to performance 
monitoring and rule enforcement, but also to changing the expectations of citizens and public servants 
about the prevalence of certain practices and about the possibilities of change. This points to the 
importance of concrete and decisive actions that contradict the conventional wisdom. For instance, 
addressing the expectation of impunity may involve sending out clear messages indicating that certain 
corrupt practices will no longer be tolerated. An example of such message is the recent move by the 
current government to clean up the public service by firing nearly 10,000 public servants following a 
crackdown against fake academic and professional certificates. 
                                                      
19
 When probed about the images or meanings associated with national identity – what does being “Tanzanian” evoke? - the findings show 
that, while the national identity is to some extent viewed as concomitant with corruption, it is also seen as being based upon moral behaviour, 
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6.2 Corruption, bribing and gift-giving 
Some authors claim that assessing corrupt practices in non-Western settings is a misguided endeavour 
given that the concept of corruption itself is an offspring of a particular conceptualisation of the state in 
the Weberian tradition, which does not travel well to other (non-Western) contexts (see, for example, 
Ruud 2000; Chang et al., 2001; and Gephart 2009). According to this line of argument, where people 
have been enculturated into different worldviews (or mental models) about the role of the individual in 
the community and the relationship to the legitimate authority figures, the concept of corruption will 
lack substantive value in the eyes of those supposedly complicit in engaging in such detrimental 
practices. 
In particular, arguments about a link between social norms and cultural values, on the one hand, and 
corruption, on the other, often refer to traditions of hospitality, gratitude, condolence or congratulation, 
which may easily be used to camouflage corrupt intentions, especially through practices of gift-giving. 
With these considerations in mind, and given the goals of the Project, during the field activities we 
sought to shed light into locally held understandings about the differences between corruption, bribing 
and gift-giving as well as the normative valuations made of each.  
Generally speaking, FGD participants in the service users’ groups agreed that there is no distinction 
between corruption and a bribe. Furthermore, in both areas respondents displayed a rather 
sophisticated and nuanced understanding about the negative impacts of corrupt practices on social 
welfare. For instance, one participant said: “if you give somebody money [a bribe] it is the same as 
corruption because you want to buy somebody’s dignity. You are causing this person [to] make things 
easy but it affects the community.” Others in the rural FGDs made a straightforward statement: “how 
does poverty come about? So many families are poor because of the bribes, maybe the kid had done 
well in the exams to go to school but was not able to because this kids’ position was taken by another 
kid [who paid a bribe].” 
Participants of the FGDs also discussed the differences between a gift and a bribe. A gift is understood 
to be “given out of goodness”; it is given openly after the service has been provided out of appreciation 
and without an explicit agreement. A bribe on the other hand, is either given unwillingly or comes along 
with an expectation of a favour or a service and has therefore an ulterior motive. Therefore, a bribe is 
used instrumentally, for example to buy one’s right to a service that formally has been rejected, while a 
gift is not.  
However, the discussions also suggested that such clear-cut differences between a gift and a bribe are 
difficult to establish in practice. FGD participants recognised that giving a gift can implicitly carry 
implications that go beyond the particular instance in which the service was provided. Some 
respondents from the rural area mentioned that providers remember that an appreciation has been 
given by a certain person and automatically tend to favour him or her in subsequent interactions. 
Research participants explained this pattern as a normal consequence of “being human” and reflecting 
the fact that “everyone has a conscience.”  
From the providers’ perspective, participants in the rural FGDs mentioned that they are used to 
receiving gifts from users in the form of material goods, such as maize, rice, goats, beans and potatoes, 
or through credit transfers via the mobile phone (such as MPESA, TIGOPESA, or AIRTEL MONEY). Due 
to the ambivalent nature of the gift, one service provider stated that one has to be able to interpret 
what the gift means in that particular context and if accepting it would create an environment in which 
one is suddenly indebted. In particular, as otherwise one easily gets into a problematic situation when 
the gift actually served the purpose of co-optation. A rural district level official shared how people 
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sometimes give gifts surreptitiously, anonymously even, only to later show up to remind the provider of 
the present and how it entitles the giver to preferential treatment. The same participant wondered: 
“how do you deal with such matters, when you have already eaten the fish he bought?”  
There was agreement that the meaning of a gift depends on the interpretation of the receiver and the 
ulterior motive of the gift by the giver. Thus, a gift can be presented simply as a token of appreciation, 
but simultaneously be perceived as a bribe if it is understood that it carries the expectation of obtaining 
a favour from the service provider at a later stage. The meaning of a gift is therefore inherently 
ambivalent in practice and as a result the distinction between a bribe and a gift becomes blurred. 
Overall, the research findings illustrate how gift-giving is deeply entrenched in Tanzanian culture and 
that by routinized practice, it has penetrated the public sphere. A district level officer in the rural area 
gave one telling example of this: 
 “I once sent someone for training in Shinyanga. There was only one position and I selected him 
specifically because he has never attended any seminar. However, he thought that because I gave him 
that opportunity he should return the favour and so he came with a present. I told him he shouldn’t worry, 
that was an opportunity [he was entitled to] but he then insisted and sent me one hundred thousand 
(TSH) to my phone.” The manager also sent that money back but the employee did not cease in his 
attempts to reciprocate what he saw as a favour from his manager rather than an entitlement and went 
as far as to sneak sacks of charcoal and rice into the manager’s household while he was away.  
This story holds important lessons about the manner in which the deeply entrenched logic of reciprocity 
obscures the comprehension of the meaning of entitlements as an inherent right, one that does not 
require the return of anything but is rather contingent on meeting certain, legally defined criteria. 
6.3 Trust in institutions and attitudes towards the state and the rule of law 
Narrow frames and mental models that normalise corruption have important consequences for the way 
in which people view the relevance of the formal legal framework and their expectations and beliefs 
about the role of public institutions in their lives. 
On the first issue, the need to overcome material constraints and the responsibilities associated with 
the relevance of social networks appear to relegate the legal order to a secondary and rather devalued 
place. In fact, several research participants conveyed a view that the formal laws are intrinsically unfair 
and, in pragmatic terms, little more than an obstacle in the pursuit of more important goals. The 
following statements captured in the FGDs reflect such feelings: 
• “The community members respect you if you help them by not just blindly following and abiding by 
government rules at work place” 
• “It is true, when you follow the rules at the local level […] there is nothing you can help with, and 
because you are unable to earn enough at the level of society you will look bad” 
• “Health workers are not well paid […] They can’t provide quality services with their low income and 
having a lot of responsibilities such as school fees for their children, they can’t provide quality service 
even if they have the will”.  
In contrast, the social norms that advance the welfare of individuals and their groups enjoy significant 
legitimacy. Therefore, it is important to underscore that one of the fundamental circumstances that 
makes corruption so problematic to combat effectively in a context such as the Tanzanian, is the 
coexistence of competing normative frameworks that are often at odds with each other. The informal 
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one, which is supported by cultural values and traditions, is widely recognised and abided by because it 
supports the practices that help people get by. In contrast, the legal framework, although prescribing 
generous rights and entitlements, is seen as useless in improving the livelihoods of people and, even 
worse, criminalising many of the actions that provide the effective social safety net.  
On the question about the attitudes towards the state and public authorities, it has to be recognised 
that the current Tanzanian government has the opportunity to radically make an impact by cultivating 
and reinforcing more positive attitudes that are discernible on the part of citizens. The findings from 
FGDs (from both the urban and rural settings) underlined the perception that the times when corruption 
was endemic and when service providers could demand bribes for every service lie in the past. Although 
field research activities were undertaken during 2016, less than a full year into President Magufuli’s 
term, it is meaningful that already research participants recognised changes in the context of service 
provision. These observations align with patterns described in Transparency International’s 2017 East 
African Bribery Index (EABI), which reports significant changes in citizen’s perception on corruption in 
Tanzania. For instance, while in 2014 the survey findings inform that 68% of respondents believed that 
the level of corruption was very high and would rise in the following year, in 2017 the survey findings 
show that 72% of respondents believed that the level of corruption was medium or low and 70% believed 
it would decrease in the coming year. Furthermore, 44% of the respondents that were of the opinion 
that corruption would decrease based their expectations on the ‘President’s commitment to fight 
corruption’. The survey also finds that in 2017, fewer people reported encountering bribery at service 
delivery points in comparison to 2014 (Transparency International 2017).  
The change seems to be strongly felt among service providers. Whereas research participants 
described a situation in which service providers continue to experience the pressures from their social 
networks, they also attested to the fact that corrupt behaviours are no longer a feasible response since 
“it won’t take time for [such a person] to be demoted or fired.” A service provider from the rural area 
suggested that nowadays it cannot be discounted that a person offering a bribe might be an official 
from the PCCB.  
Thus, the perception that anti-corruption enforcement is tightening means that the opportunity space to 
give in to network pressures is shrinking. Interestingly, service providers are now developing a new 
language to convey the situation. According to anecdotal evidence, public officials who cannot grant a 
favour or provide in the amounts expected by their networks resort to simply stating “Magufuli”, to 
communicate the idea that under the current president things have changed. This could signal that 
alternative mental models are beginning to emerge involving the expectation that getting away with 
corruption is no longer easy and that austerity and integrity are valued. Additional evidence 
documenting the impact of the current regime’s policies has been compiled by one of the authors of 
this report in the scope of a parallel research project. The research found that the phrase Maisha 
magumu (referring to a difficult life) has become a frequently used expression even among elites to 
denote recent changes in terms of a scarcity of opportunities to access resources, including 
opportunities to make quick money through allowances, tax evasion and winning tenders by means of 
dubious deals. For individuals employed in the public sector, Maisha magumu means having to live on 
the salary because the loopholes for acquiring informal income supplements have been closed 
(Sambaiga forthcoming 2018). 
This changing political environment seems to be associated with the high levels of trust that 
respondents to the Project’s survey reported vis-à-vis state organs. For instance, the majority of 
respondents in Dar es Salaam asserted having ‘high trust’ in the President (57%) and the majority of the 
respondents in the rural Bukoba District even noted having ‘total trust’ in this office (55%). This high 
level of trust also seems to influence the confidence respondents have in the more traditional anti-
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corruption institutions in Tanzania, such as the PCCB, as the respondents most often noted having ‘high 
trust’ (34%) in this institution. Figure 4 gives further details on the levels of trust survey respondents 
have in different public and non-public institutions in Tanzania.  
 
Figure 4: Average responses regarding trust in institutions in Tanzania (1 = no trust, 2 = low trust, 3 = indifferent, 4 = high trust and 5 = total 
trust) 
A previous study concluded in 2013, in which we conducted a similar survey on institutional trust 
among citizens in Dar es Salaam, provides comparable data to contrast levels in institutional trust with 
those reported in the current study, conducted in 2017. Figure 5 shows the differences in levels of 
institutional trust between those two years.  
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What is perhaps most striking in the new series is the significantly higher level of trust given to the 
national and local government. This is a radical change that seems to be confirmed by informally 
captured perceptions following the finalisation of field research activities for the Project. Although the 
survey results are not generalizable to the entire country and must only be seen as indicative of broad 
trends, it is nonetheless possible to think that mental models in Tanzania are changing, and that the 
state is increasingly regarded as an agent of positive change. In support to this, Sambaiga (forthcoming 
2018) has also found that ordinary citizens increasingly credit the current administration with changing 
the attitudes of public services when it comes to service delivery: “discipline is back to public 
servants…we get quality service even when we don’t know the service provider”. There are also 
accounts of improved conditions at Muhimbili national hospital and recognition that service providers 
are working harder than was the case before with lower levels of absenteeism. Significantly, the 2017 
East African Bribery Index corroborates these patterns and finds that a large majority of respondents 
(74%) believed that the ‘government was doing enough to fight corruption’ and rated the performance of 









7.1 Behavioural determinants of petty corruption in Tanzania 
This report has shed light into the attitudes and experiences of Tanzanian citizens when accessing 
public services. The research data suggest that, especially in the health sector, petty corruption is 
expected to take place in the encounters between citizens and public officials and that formal rights 
and entitlements are perceived to lack relevance for the provision of public services. Rather, access to 
services seems to be informally regulated by the personal relationships of the service providers and the 
ability to provide a bribe or a gift. The result is a regressive system that is enacted on the basis of 
behavioural patterns emanating from social norms and values, narrow frames and collectively held 
mental models. Indeed, the evidence supports the notion that all three of the behavioural principles of 
human decision-making outlined in the 2015 WDR are relevant in explaining the persistence of 
practices of petty corruption in Tanzania.  
Overall, the findings do not support any notion that social and cultural traits make people unaware 
about the meaning of corruption and its negative connotations. Quite to the contrary, research 
participants displayed a nuanced understanding of what constitutes a corrupt act and about the 
consequences of corruption. However, the research does indicate that social norms and cultural values 
do reinforce particular practices and beliefs that are closely linked with high levels of petty corruption. 
Notwithstanding this observation, it must be stressed that the research findings underscore that 
practices of petty corruption are fundamentally motivated, not by cultural factors, but by adverse 
conditions involving scarcity, inadequate quality of the services available to the public and the lack of an 
effective social safety net. This is further corroborated by the 2017 PCCB survey, where most of the 
respondents named poverty, high costs of living, inflation and inefficient bureaucracy/public service 
delivery as key drivers of corruption (PCCB 2017). Thus, poverty and the inability of the formal rules and 
institutions to ensure a minimum standard of living are compounded to give prominence to an informal 
normative framework based on social norms of solidarity and reciprocity, which is highly valued because 
of its functionality in delivering results, pooling resources and solving problems.  
Two key social norms that stand out for their relevance are the obligation to contribute to the welfare of 
one’s own group and the duty to reciprocate favours and gifts received. Both norms are pragmatically 
articulated through the actions of informal social networks and translate into practices of favouritism 
and bribery (often camouflaged as gift-giving) common in the provision of public services. The social 
norms also determine the acceptability of different types of corrupt actions. In particular, corrupt 
actions that promote socially justified goals (i.e. paying school fees for a relative or repaying a favour) 
are rewarded but actions deemed to stem out of greed and selfishness (i.e. not helping a relative or 
friend in need), are punished even if pursued in adherence to a legal mandate.  
A significant insight came from the manner in which research participants described a situation in 
which a provider does not favour family and friends and does not accept bribes and gifts. According to 
the collected views, this provider would be denying his networks of the advantages that public sector 
employment offers, and would therefore be considered to be misusing his or her position for individual 
gain, which, strikingly similar to most definitions of corruption. This underscores the importance of 
recognising the impact that the coexistence of two normative frameworks has on addressing practices 
of petty corruption. In a first instance, making a value judgement of any given action requires 
understanding with regards to which normative framework such an evaluation is done. Thus, it could be 
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said that in some cases what is considered correct and honest behaviour with respect to the normative 
framework that is socially enforced can be considered corrupt from the perspective of the formal legal 
order and vice versa. This insight strongly emphasises the challenges arising when the socially accepted 
and the legally formulated normative frameworks are far away from each other. 
The tensions and contradictions that stem from the juxtaposition of a formal and an informal set of 
rules are resolved in practice in several ways. For instance, narrow frames that confirm that practises of 
petty corruption represent the normal state of affairs and mental models of weak law enforcement 
reinforce the social motivations to give in to bribery and favouritism. The same can be said about 
mental models concerning typical attitudes of public servants that prompt users to prepare in advance 
with money to facilitate a bribe when coming to the service point. Similarly, work environments that are 
perceived as permissive, if not encouraging, of corrupt actions end up creating peer pressure to join in. 
Interestingly, while the reasons to resort to acts of corruption might be blatantly clear, the recurrent 
mention about the creation of “environments” conducive to a corrupt exchange show that people still 
feel the need to set the stage in order to move from one sphere (legal) to another (social or familial) 
demonstrating an awareness about the illicit nature of the deal.  
All factors considered, ultimately the result is that adherence to the social norm has been perceived to 
be more binding than observing the formal law. In fact, at least until recently, breaking social norms was 
expected to carry much more serious consequences as compared to infringements of the legal 
framework. In this regard, status and respect as well as social isolation and shaming have been key 
elements in this system of informal norm enforcement. However, as the report has indicated, this 
situation may be beginning to change under the current administration.  
Although the research findings stem from a period shortly after President Magufuli came to power, 
already they revealed how public officials find themselves in a complicated position as a result of trying 
to reconcile the demands imposed by the social norms and accepted practices with a more stringent 
workplace discipline. Such instances of exacerbated tensions should be considered as an entry point to 
catalyse anti-corruption efforts in the delivery of public services. The same could be said about actions 
taken by the current administration, some concrete and others of a more symbolic nature, which 
directly confront stereotypes and contradict preconceptions. For instance, it can be said that the 
expectation that social networks are entitled to reap the benefits from the relative or friend that 
occupies a position of public authority has been put into question, if not actively challenged, by the 
policies and the tone set by the administration of John Magufuli, whereby austerity and integrity are 
being exalted as the desirable attributes in public administration. The fact that there seems to be an 
appetite to take up these ideas – witnessed by the “what would Magufuli do?” social media frenzy that 
followed some of the first austerity measures of the current administration – suggests that this is an 
area in which more could be done to support a change of what are deemed socially accepted 
behaviours and expectations with an emphasis on austerity, integrity and honest behaviours as 
conducive to public praise and conferring respectability to the public servant. 
Although behavioural studies are still in a relatively young stage when it comes to providing empirical 
evidence to inform public policy, there is nevertheless a growing body of research and experimental 
trials that strongly support the potential of incorporating behavioural insights to promote better state 
performance and development outcomes (see for example, OECD 2017). Furthermore, recent studies 
show that social norms can change on the basis of exposure to consistent messages by authorities and 
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it can happen in a relatively short period of time if properly reinforced.20 In this regard, the current 
Tanzanian context, with a committed leadership that enjoys strong social support, presents a 
particularly propitious opportunity to complement conventional policy making with behavioural 
interventions based on evidence of what motivates individual decision-making in order to promote 
systemic change. 
7.2 Policy implications 
As the review of the relative effectiveness of anti-corruption interventions suggests, policies and 
strategies that question commonly held beliefs are effective in addressing narrow frames and shifting 
mental models (Stahl, Kassa, and Baez-Camargo 2017). Two key points need to be emphasised in this 
regard:  
• Firstly, reinforcing and emphasising actions and messages that challenge conventional wisdom 
is essential, particularly when it comes to the expectation that corruption is inevitable and that 
is tends to go unpunished.  
• Secondly, individuals are highly pragmatic, as evidenced by the functionality of the practices of 
petty corruption, and for that reason they are more likely to react to messages that clearly 
outline the hidden costs of corruption that exist beyond a short-term and short-lived benefit. 
7.2.1 Promoting changes to the popular culture of corruption 
Challenging conventional wisdom involves the dissemination of strong, consistent and carefully 
formulated messages on the part of the government and key opinion leaders. Overall, a message that 
change is possible and palpable should be reinforced.  
The current political moment in Tanzania is such that it would be particularly important to forcefully 
showcase key government actions as heralding the shift to a new paradigm in governance for Tanzania. 
Particularly, leadership matters because individuals look up to the actions of their political leaders as 
role models.21 In this regard, certain actions, such as President Magufuli’s move to sack a Minister who 
was known to be a close friend of his, throw into question the acceptability of tolerating illicit 
behaviours for the sake of personal relationships. Other concrete actions of the government that should 
be showcased are successful prosecutions and convictions of crimes of corruption. The recent publicly 
displayed arrests of high level figures associated with the “Escrow scandal” (who previously were 
regarded as untouchables) is a good example of how cases of exemplary punishment can challenge the 
mental model that impunity is the norm.  
The assessment of the relative effectiveness of anti-corruption interventions that was conducted in the 
scope of the Literature Review (Stahl, Kassa, and Baez-Camargo 2017) reinforces some of the lessons 
about the power of information in changing minds and behaviours. Specifically, in contexts where 
corruption is endemic, informational campaigns that focus on awareness raising of formal rights and 
entitlements and building capacity to aid citizens in identifying instances of corruption tend to have only 
moderate success. When behaviours are influenced by quasi-rational factors such as narrow frames and 
mental models, the evidence from the review suggests that an effective way to challenge conventional 
                                                      
20
 See for example the work of Prof Chris Crandall that demonstrates rapid change in the acceptability of certain norms under the Trump 
administration. https://undark.org/article/trump-social-psychology-prejudice-unleashed/ 
21
 This has been evidenced in the studies in Uganda and Rwanda that have also been undertaken in the scope of the Project. In the case of 
Uganda people reference the publicly available evidence about the crimes of corruption committed by some of presidents Museveni’s close 
associates to justify their own engagement in acts of corruption. Conversely in Rwanda, people reference the high levels of integrity president 
Paul Kagame is credited with as a crucial example of the parameters of behavior expected of Rwandan citizens.  
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wisdom is by disseminating stories and illustrative examples of how corruption hurts individuals and 
families and contradicting notions that the corrupt are successful in life. In this regard, there is 
increasing evidence about the effectiveness of so-called “edutainment” campaigns in disseminating and 
convincingly communicating positive messages via soap operas and other variations of storytelling 
where positive role models are reinforced (see for example Hoffman and Patel 2017, 30). 
• Developing and strongly disseminating messages via mass media interventions aimed at 
challenging preconceptions and stereotypes about corruption. Carefully selected government 
actions and decisions can provide a reference point to developing public awareness-raising 
campaigns signalling that definitive changes in governance practices are underway. 
The research suggests several themes that could be brought to the fore via “edutainment” campaigns 
to change mental models and entrenched practices.22 One key area that the research findings suggest 
as important to address is the lagging awareness among relatives and friends of service providers that 
extracting rents and dispensing favours for the benefit of the group at the expense of public resources 
is no longer without serious consequences. Emphasis could be made on the costs of having a 
breadwinner in the family lose employment and even be convicted for a crime of corruption.23 Another 
topic that can be addressed through creative storylines refers to gift-giving and the reciprocation of 
favours and gifts. As the research evidenced, it would be important to underscore the notion that public 
services provided represent entitlements and not favours or gifts and therefore need not be 
reciprocated. The same goes for promotions and opportunities for career development in the public 
sector, which should be understood as hinging on the basis of qualifications and professional merit 
rather than personal relations and loyalty.  
One other topic that merits special attention refers to the worrisome lack of regard to the value of the 
rule of law that research participants in both areas described as being a normal attitude prevailing in 
their communities. According to the evidence generated by the Project, such attitudes are related to 
the perceived ineffectiveness and even corruption of the law enforcement agencies, which reinforces a 
mental model where corruption and impunity are accepted as normal. Therefore, improving the public 
image of law enforcement agencies is a significant challenge that must be addressed in order to 
overhaul attitudes that are at the minimum permissive towards corrupt behaviours. In this regard, it is 
clear that decisive reforms to curb out corruption from within the law enforcement agencies and to 
adequately support the competencies to investigate and prosecute financial crimes are necessary. This 
will support closing the implementation gap and thereby the successful investigation and prosecution of 
high level cases of corruption. While reforming the anti-corruption system represents a formidable 
challenge in any country, requiring time and commitment at the highest levels as well as the right 
technical approach, the argument made here is that such substantive reform efforts may be 
successfully complemented with supporting measures informed by behavioural insights. 
The Georgian case demonstrates that transforming its police force from being one of the most corrupt 
among the post-Soviet republics to becoming one of the most trusted institution in the eyes of citizens 
required nothing short of a purge of an entire police corps and a whole array of measures aimed at 
                                                      
22
 The media was among the most trusted institutions and perceived to be an effective actor in combatting corruption according to the 2017 
PCCB survey and would therefore constitute a promising vessel to diffuse anti-corruption relevant information. 
23 OSCE has supported the production of several edutainment short clips in Uzbekistan that in just a few minutes send a strong message 
about the costs of corruption for the family. These videos are an excellent example of a behavioural anti-corruption intervention appealing to 
sentiments and elements of sociality rather than lecturing on formal rights and legal definitions of corruption. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dN6P8dl6hzA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lKp9YV7VQQA. 
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institutional transformation (Devlin 2010). However, the Georgian experience also informs how, in order 
to tackle citizen mistrust and habits of corruption, other interventions that can be categorised 
‘behavioural’ can be undertaken to enhance the credibility of the police reforms. In this regard, 
rebranding through the introduction of new uniforms and other gear was an important aspect of the 
reform strategy and demonstrated a clear break with the Shevardnadze era.24 Even small physical 
elements, such as lapel pins or slogans on police cars could provide effective heuristic cues to reinforce 
positive behavioural change.  
• Showcasing substantive reform initiatives of the government to combat corruption in the police 
and other public institutions, which are reinforced with visible signs of change. Complementing 
initiatives to reform the police and other state institutions with physical cues that are indicative of 
change and associated with the promise of a better service can be effective not only in changing 
citizens’ attitudes towards the police and the state, but can also meaningfully foster cadres’ 
morale and reinforce commitment to professional ethics. 
With regard to the salient role that factors of sociality had in the findings of the Project, it would be 
desirable to explore the potential of social networks to provide an innovative vehicle for the promotion 
of changes to the popular culture of corruption and associated behaviours. In this regard, there is an 
emerging field of research that is uncovering the attributes and potential of social networks for effecting 
social change. According to this research, networks are effective mechanisms to spread ideas and 
shape social norms that affect what people believe is acceptable. This has significant implications for 
the sustainability of social transformation because networks tend to be multi-centric and have therefore 
a resilience that is independent of particular individuals and therefore allows modal beliefs and 
behaviours to persist across time. Studies of contagion effects across networks have included 
instances of transmission of voting behaviour and altruistic acts; and there is experimental evidence 
that indicates the effectiveness of social networks as vehicles for delivering certain interventions (see 
for example Kim et al. 2015, Christakis and Fowler 2013, and Nishi et al. 2015). Thus, the Project 
findings regarding the high allegiance to social networks and the values of solidarity and reciprocity they 
espouse could be creatively harnessed in pursuit of better development outcomes and the fight against 
corruption. 
• Applying techniques that have been tested in other fields to identify influential individuals 
within social networks and working with them as anti-corruption champions to diffuse 
important information and promote certain behavioural changes. This has the potential of 
maximising intervention impact by virtue of the intrinsic properties of social networks 
whereby knowledge and behaviour can spread exponentially across interpersonal ties.  
7.2.2 Developing sector-specific behavioural interventions 
Interventions that involve positive environmental cues can also be developed to address entrenched 
habits of corruption in the workplace in specific sectors. In particular, the Project has generated 
evidence about high levels of corruption in the health sector that are associated to the conflicting 
pressures service providers are confronted with on a daily basis. The research indicates that peer 
pressure among health workers can exacerbate corruption risks along with the unsolicited proactive 
efforts of users to befriend health workers. The literature suggests that certain changes in the work 
environment can be useful to combat the narrow frame about the inevitability of corruption, reinforcing 
macro-level priming about the top-down commitment to enforce a zero tolerance to corruption culture.  
                                                      
24
 See (World Bank 2012) on the Georgia anti-corruption experience generally and (Puppo 2010) on the reform to the police specifically. 
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• Small, simple interventions might be effective to propel and reinforce positive changes in 
organisational culture. Different heuristic cues can be explored and tested for their 
relative effectiveness, examples of which may range from improving the visibility of official 
rules and procedures (for example by means of displaying citizens’ or patients’ charters) 
to smaller symbolic gestures (such as one tested in an intervention in Serbia where health 
staff were required to wear pins with the legend “I work for the salary not for the bribe”). 
Concrete, tangible changes in the operational environment of public service provision might also help 
restrict the opportunities for creating “privatised environments” that shelter obscure transactions. One 
example of how this has been addressed is the introduction of digitalized queue management systems, 
where numbers are dispensed in order to maintain a visible first-come, first-served order. In Rwanda, 
where the issues of favouritism have also been a concern in the provision of health services, electronic 
queuing has been successful in precluding informal practices from denying timely access to services to 
those abiding by the rules and to the most vulnerable groups who lack the resources to employ informal 
strategies to expedite services. 
Furthermore, the evidence from the research highlights how the providers of public services stand in a 
position where the divergent demands of the formal and informal normative frameworks collide. Service 
providers are subject to multiple social expectations and demands that often contradict their formal 
duties. It should be noted that the perception that the informal norms are relatively more strictly 
enforced than the formal legal framework is changing due to the efforts undertaken by the current 
administration to tighten law enforcement. However, the research findings indicate that there are still 
significant pressures exerted on the service providers who testify to feeling stressed and overwhelmed 
by the (sometimes unrealistic) expectations on the part of their networks.  
In this sense, as practitioners we need to think about innovative interventions by means of which the 
increased credibility of sanctions in the workplace is reinforced by positive incentives by developing 
schemes that actually reward honesty. Testing different interventions involving awards, bonuses and 
recognitions that explicitly reward honest behaviours would be a feasible approach to address the issue 
of the incentives of the social networks. Operationalising such an approach would involve developing 
tools that capture user satisfaction. In this regard, citizen scorecards (such as the ones used in 
Rwanda) or similar instruments could be used to gather information on performance to determine 
bonuses, promotions and awards. 
In addition, the informal sanctioning mechanisms whereby rejecting corrupt transactions lead to loss of 
status and shaming could be countered as part of mass media edutainment interventions (as described 
above) and reinforced by public naming and shaming of individuals proven guilty of corruption 
offenses.25 
• Reshuffling the incentives of the service providers in a way that responds to the conflicting 
normative directives they are confronted with would involve introducing positive incentive 
schemes by means of which honest behaviour is tangibly rewarded and therefore made relatively 
more attractive also to the social networks. This would give them incentives to make sure the 
service provider acts with integrity, and increasing the social costs of malfeasance by means of 
shaming. 
                                                      
25
 The naming and shaming approach is used extensively in Rwanda, where authorities publish not only the names of those guilty of acts of 
corruption but also the names of their parents and the communities they come from. In this manner, the Rwandan government has heightened 
the social costs of being caught committing crimes of corruption. 
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7.2.3 Vulnerable groups and gender issues 
Another key topic that came out strongly in the research findings and that is reason for concern is the 
apparent prevalence of sexual corruption. Although the anti-corruption laws in Tanzania criminalise 
sexual corruption, the research findings confirm the continued prevalence of such practices. This 
deserves special attention, as sexual corruption is hardly comparable to other types of corruption. For 
instance, one key question is whether in cases of sexual corruption, the actions of both the bribe taker 
and the bribe giver should be equally criminalised. Some scholars have made the argument that 
regardless of who requests the sexual exchange, only the public official (and not the woman) should 
face corruption charges mainly because the power asymmetry makes any argument about consent 
questionable. Corruption charges however should proceed when a woman makes a sexual proposal to 
obtain a favour from a public official and the latter refuses, in which case the woman is guilty of 
attempted bribery (Gitlin 2016).  
If one were to agree with this interpretation, then it would be of utmost importance to raise awareness 
among male public officials of the implications and consequences of accepting sexual favours from the 
public, possibly in a light that makes such offenses particularly shameful and costly. It would be equally 
important to sensitise the victims of such crimes more generally on their rights and more specifically 
about the legal instruments available to report such transgressions. These messages could be 
disseminated and reinforced via “edutainment” campaigns where positive role models could be 
promoted. The Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA) has implemented some good examples 
of this kind of awareness-raising campaign, for instance by means of a television advertisement warning 
about sextortion. The advertisement shows an amorous man attempting to seduce a female school 
student, to which she responds by confidently rejecting the sexual advances saying “sidanganyiki” 
meaning “I cannot be deceived.” In the end, the embarrassed man shamefully walks away (TAWJA 
2014). This is an example of how “edutainment” can be used to frame messages about sexual 
corruption, which could be further explored and strengthened by means of rigorous testing in a quasi 
experimental framework to probe for the kind of messages; formats and channels that yield the most 
effective response in a particular local setting.  
In addition, positive role models of engaged, empowered women could be sought out to improve 
denouncing rates among victims of sexual corruption. For example, a positive experience fighting sexual 
corruption in the education sector in Cameroon involved enabling female students at a University to 
bring their grievances about unwanted sexual advances by their teachers to one of the highly respected 
Vice-Chancellors, who conveyed a strong presence as a female role model (Little 2014).  
• Raising costs – in terms of criminal sanctioning and social shaming - of soliciting or accepting 
sexual favours on the part of male public officials. Providing information, raising awareness and 
establishing safe whistle-blower mechanisms for women to denounce unwanted sexual advances, 
preferably linked to a strong, positive female role model. 
7.2.4 An agenda for testing behavioural approaches to anti-corruption 
The research on behavioural drivers of corrupt behaviours delivers evidence about the processes and 
areas that are promising entry points for developing interventions aiming at promoting behavioural 
change in support of better development outcomes. However, adequate contextualisation of any 
development intervention is crucial, especially in the case of behavioural interventions, as it is extremely 
difficult to predict which precise approach is going to be most effective at appealing and making sense 
to the intended target groups. Therefore, practitioners must be prepared to experiment and test 
different approaches to find out to which the target populations are most responsive. 
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• Developing pilot interventions to test different approaches to behavioural interventions by 
means of rigorous experimental methods such as randomised control trials in order to 
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